An Intersectional Definition of Fairness by Foulds, James et al.
An Intersectional Definition of Fairness
James Foulds and Shimei Pan
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
{jfoulds, shimei}@umbc.edu
Abstract
We introduce a measure of fairness for algorithms and data with regard to multiple protected attributes.
Our proposed definition, differential fairness, is informed by the framework of intersectionality, which ana-
lyzes how interlocking systems of power and oppression affect individuals along overlapping dimensions
including race, gender, sexual orientation, class, and disability. We show that our criterion behaves sensibly
for any subset of the set of protected attributes, and we illustrate links to differential privacy. A case study on
census data demonstrates the utility of our approach.
1 Introduction
With the rising influence of machine learning algorithms on many important aspects of our daily lives, there
are growing concerns that biases inherent in data can lead the behavior of these algorithms to discriminate
against certain populations [1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 28, 29, 15]. In recent years, substantial research effort has been
devoted to the development of mathematical definitions of bias, or its opposite, fairness, in algorithms and in
data [15, 18, 26, 23, 19, 32].
In this work, we focus on the fairness scenario where there are multiple protected attributes that we aim to
ensure fairness for, and which may potentially overlap with each other, such as gender, race, and sexual
orientation. Our guiding principle is intersectionality, the core theoretical framework underlying the third-
wave feminist movement [13]. The principle of intersectionality states that racism, sexism, and other social
systems which harm marginalized groups are interlocking in their effects, such that the lived experience
of, e.g., black women, is very different than that of, e.g., white women. Intersectionality was defined
by Kimberle´ Crenshaw in the 1980’s [13] and popularized in the 1990’s, e.g. by Patricia Hill Collins [10],
although the ideas are much older [11, 35]. In the context of machine learning and fairness, intersectionality
was recently considered by [7], who studied the impact of the intersection of gender and skin color on
computer vision performance, and by [23, 19], who aimed to protect certain subgroups in order to prevent
“fairness gerrymandering.” From a humanities perspective, [29] critiqued the behavior of the Google search
engine with an intersectional lens, by examining the search results for terms relating to women and people
of color, e.g. “black girls.”
Inspired by intersectionality theory, our primary contribution is a mathematical definition of fairness,
which we call differential fairness, that aims for equity at the intersections of a set of protected attributes. While
other authors have considered multiple protected attributes, cf. [7, 26, 23, 19], to our knowledge, we are
the first to provide a quantifiable measure of fairness which, when satisfied, is provably satisfied to a similar
degree across each subset of the set of protected attributes. For instance, if our differential fairness criterion is
satisfied for an algorithm with regard to a set of protected attributes consisting of gender, race, and nationality,
it is similarly satisfied with regard to the subset of the protected attributes consisting of gender and race, or
of race alone, and so on. This property is important in an intersectional fairness context: if our goal were
to ensure equity in the behavior of an algorithm between, say, black women and white men, we would
typically also desire to ensure that women were treated equitably with men overall, and that different races
were treated equitably overall.
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Differential fairness has several other attractive properties. Drawing inspiration from differential privacy,
our definition, when sufficiently satisfied, provides privacy guarantees which help prevent discrimination
based on the algorithm’s outcomes, as in [15], and which provide an interpretation of the degree of fairness
that is obtained. Since it is motivated by intersectionality theory, rather than modeling individual-level
notions of merit or risk, which are frequently impacted by unfair societal processes, it aims to address
structural and systemic biases. As a consequence, differential fairness is lightweight, in that it does not
require the specification or estimation of a causal model [26] or a latent model of risk distributions [32]. It
is nevertheless able to make use of a probabilistic model of the data, when available, but does not require
one. While no fairness definition is suitable in all contexts, due to these properties we recommend the use of
differential fairness when an intersectional measure of fairness is appropriate.
Although our criterion is a formal mathematical definition of fairness, and we present several theoretical
results, we emphasize that the aims of this work are not theoretical in nature. Rather, we advocate for the
use of our differential fairness framework as a practical technique for measuring and critiquing the fairness
properties of real-world artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) systems, in order to detect
fairness issues, and to potentially weigh these properties against other considerations such as classification
performance, cost effectiveness, and scalability. Differential fairness provides a quantifiable metric for the
“fairness cost” of an algorithm, which allows different algorithms to be compared. We anticipate use-cases
within the development cycle of AI and ML systems, including hyper-parameter tuning, model selection,
and feature engineering, for which we provide a case study, and in the critiquing of deployed systems by
scholars and activists, as in [1]. Differential fairness can also measure the inequity in data, which enables its
use for critiquing the fairness properties of black box systems and of social processes such as stop-and-frisk
policing [32].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses fairness for AI/ML systems, and
its relationship to intersectionality theory. In Section 3, we introduce our differential fairness criterion, and
derive several useful properties which motivate its use in an intersectional fairness context. We then extend
the definition to measuring bias in data, e.g. from a black-box system, in Section 4. We present worked
examples which illustrate the calculation of differential fairness in Section 5, followed by a case study in
Section 6. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 Algorithmic Fairness and its Relation to Intersectionality
Fairness is a complicated socio-technical construct with a multitude of political and legal facets, which may be
in conflict with each other and with the original goals of the algorithm such as predictive accuracy [4]. Part of
the challenge is that protected attributes such as gender or race, for which we’d like to prevent bias, do not exist
in isolation, but in the context of other observed and latent attributes, and each of these may be correlated
with each other and with the outputs of the system. Even when the use of protected attributes is disallowed,
other correlated proxy variables may exist which will lead a classifier to unintentionally discriminate. For
example, zip codes are highly correlated with race [21]. On the other hand, attributes which are important
for the algorithm may have different distributions depending on the protected attributes; a phenomenon
known as infra-marginality [32]. Consequently, equity may not always correspond to fairness, as defined by
[34].
It is also important to connect fairness and bias in algorithms to the broader context of fairness and bias in
society, which has long been the concern of civil rights and feminist scholars and activists [29]. Of particular
relevance is the principle of intersectionality from the third-wave feminist movement [13]. Intersectional
feminist scholars have noted that systems of oppression built into society lead to systematic disadvantages
along intersecting dimensions, which include not only gender, but also race, nationality, sexual orientation,
disability status, and socioeconomic class [11, 10, 13, 20, 27, 35].
While the infra-marginality principle states that differences in the distributions of the “merit” or “risk”
(e.g. the probability of carrying contraband at a policy stop) of individuals from protected groups should be
taken into account, intersectionality theory provides a counterpoint: these differences, while acknowledged,
are frequently due to systemic structural disadvantages such as racism, sexism, inter-generational poverty,
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the school-to-prison pipeline, and the prison-industrial complex [11, 13, 20, 36, 14, 37]. Systems of oppression
can lead individuals to perform below their potential, for instance by reducing available cognitive bandwidth
[36], or by increasing the probability of incarceration [37, 14]. These systems are interlocking in their effect
on individuals at the intersection of multiple protected categories [11, 13]. Distributions of merit and risk are
hence influenced by unfair societal processes. Even fairness definitions that specifically model the merit or
risk properties of individuals through latent variables [32] or causal modeling [26] can thus appear unfair
when viewed through the lens of intersectionality, if they do not take into account the structural factors
which systematically affect these properties.
From an intersectional perspective, in many fairness contexts, algorithms should be designed to counteract
the effects of these systems of oppression. In some cases, this may be at the expense of predictive accuracy
[4]. However, we must be careful to distinguish between the statistical problem of classification, and the
economic problem of the assignment of outcomes to individuals based on classification. Intersectionality is
concerned with the latter, which has real personal and economic consequences [28], and may reasonably be
accomplished at some expense to the former. Note that the determination of whether, in a given context,
fairness should accommodate differences between protected groups, or counteract them, may involve a
political judgment. In summary, we argue that an intersectional definition of fairness for algorithms should
have the following properties:
• Multiple protected attributes should be considered simultaneously.
• All of the intersecting values of the protected attributes, e.g. black women, should be protected under the
definition. At the same time, we should ensure that the individual protected attributes are protected
overall, e.g. women are protected.
• The definition should aim to ensure that systematic differences in the behavior of the algorithm, due to
structural oppression, are rectified, rather than codified.
In the next section, we propose such a definition.
3 Differential Fairness
We consider the task of assigning outcomes to individuals, e.g. making lending decisions for loan applicants,
which in a machine learning context is typically accomplished by a classification algorithm. The goal is to
accomplish this while preventing discriminatory (or other) bias with respect to a set of protected attributes,
such as gender, race, and disability status. Specifically, according to our intersectional fairness criteria stated
above, we aim to ensure that the individuals at each intersecting value of the protected attributes, e.g. white,
male, and physically disabled, will on average be treated similarly by the algorithm. In many cases, the user of
the classifications (the vendor), who is often not the data owner, may also be untrusted, and should not access
the input data [15].
We address this by defining a fairness criterion which ensures that the classifications are not informative of
the intersection of the protected attributes. Suppose M(x) is a (possibly randomized) mechanism which takes
an instance x and produces an outcome y for the corresponding individual, S1, . . . , Sp are discrete-valued
protected attributes, A = S1 × S2 × . . .× Sp, and Θ is a set of distributions θ which could plausibly generate
each instance x.1 (Alternatively, Θ is the set of possible beliefs that the vendor or an adversary may have
about the data.) For example, the mechanism M(x) could be a deep learning model for a lending decision,
A could be the applicant’s possible gender and race, and Θ could be the set of Gaussian distributions over
credit scores per value of the protected attributes, with mean and standard deviation within a certain range.
The protected attributes are included in the attribute vector x, although M(x) is free to disregard them. See
Figure 1 for a diagram of the setting.
Our proposed criterion, differential fairness (DF), is a measurement of the degree of (un)fairness of
the mechanism. It applies at the population level, but a specific individual i may still be unlikely to, e.g.,
1Continuous protected attributes are also possible, in which case sums are replaced by integrals in the proofs below.
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Figure 1: Diagram of the setting for differential fairness.
be offered a loan, based on their data xi. Differential fairness measures the fairness cost of M(x) with a
parameter e:
Definition 3.1. A mechanism M(x) is e-differentially fair (DF) in a framework (A,Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with x ∼ θ,
and y ∈ Range(M),
e−e ≤ PM,θ(M(x) = y|si, θ)
PM,θ(M(x) = y|sj, θ) ≤ e
e , (1)
for all (si, sj) ∈ A× A where P(si|θ) > 0, P(sj|θ) > 0.
In Definition 3.1, si, sj ∈ A are tuples of all protected attribute values, e.g. gender, race, and nationality.
This is an intuitive intersectional definition of fairness: regardless of the combination of protected attributes, the
probabilities of the outcomes will be similar, as measured by the ratios versus other possible values of those
variables, for small values of e. For example, the probability of being given a loan would be similar regardless
of a protected group’s intersecting combination of gender, race, and nationality, marginalizing over the
remaining attributes in x. If the probabilities are always equal, then e = 0.
To evaluate the differential fairness of a mechanism in practice, we must have access to a class of plausible
distributions Θ over the data x (which could be a single point estimate Θ = {θˆ}).2 This can be accomplished
by training a Bayesian probabilistic model on an observed dataset, and setting Θ to be either a MAP estimate,
a set of burned-in MCMC samples, the posterior predictive distribution, or a credible region. Alternatively,
we can simply plug in the empirical data distribution, in which case we refer to the criterion as empirical
differential fairness (EDF).
Definition 3.2. A mechanism M(x) is e-empirically differentially fair (EDF) in a framework (A, D), where
D = {x1, . . . , xN} is a dataset, if it is e-differentially fair in (A, {PData(x)}), where PData(x) = 1N ∑Ni=1 δ(xi).
We provide illustrative worked examples for calculating (empirical) differential fairness in Section 5, and
a case study in Section 6. First, we derive several useful properties of differential fairness, which motivate its
use as a measurement tool for fairness in an intersectional context.
2In the definition, the use of a class of distributions Θ, instead of a single distribution θ, allows for uncertainty in the data distribution.
In the privacy interpretation of differential fairness (Section 3.2), it enables privacy when the vendor or an adversary’s beliefs may take
a range of values, cf. pufferfish [24]. Also note that we abuse notation slightly, using θ and Θ to refer either to distributions, or to model
parameters encoding those distributions.
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3.1 Differential Fairness and Intersectionality
In the intersectional setting, where A contains multiple protected attributes, differential fairness implies
fairness with respect to each of the protected attributes individually:
Theorem 3.1. Let M be an e-differentially fair mechanism in (A,Θ), A = S1 × S2. Then M is 2e-differentially
fair in (S1,Θ).
Proof. Let θ ∈ Θ. Then for any outcome y, and (si, sj) ∈ S1 × S1 where P(si|θ) > 0 and P(sj|θ) > 0, let a
be any value of S2 where P(S2 = a, S1 = si|θ) > 0. (Such an a must exist, since P(si|θ) = ∑s2∈S2 P(S2 =
s2, si|θ) > 0.) Then we have:
PM,θ(M(x) = y|S1 = si, θ)
PM,θ(M(x) = y|S1 = sj, θ) =
∑s2∈S2 PM,θ(M(x) = y, s2|si, θ)
∑s2∈S2 PM,θ(M(x) = y, s2|sj, θ)
=
∑s2∈S2 PM,θ(M(x) = y|s2, si, θ)PM,θ(s2|si, θ)
∑s2∈S2 PM,θ(M(x) = y|s2, sj, θ)PM,θ(s2|sj, θ)
=
∑s2∈S2 PM,θ(M(x) = y|s2, si, θ)Pθ(s2|si, θ)
∑s2∈S2 PM,θ(M(x) = y|s2, sj, θ)Pθ(s2|sj, θ)
× PM,θ(M(x) = y|a, si, θ)
PM,θ(M(x) = y|a, si, θ)
=
∑s2∈S2
PM,θ(M(x)=y|s2,si ,θ)
PM,θ(M(x)=y|a,si ,θ) Pθ(s2|si, θ)
∑s2∈S2
PM,θ(M(x)=y|s2,sj ,θ)
PM,θ(M(x)=y|a,si ,θ) Pθ(s2|sj, θ)
≤ ∑s2∈S2 e
ePθ(s2|si, θ)
∑s2∈S2 e−ePθ(s2|sj, θ)
= e2e . (2)
Reversing si and sj and taking the reciprocal shows the other inequality. Note that in showing the last
inequality, we must be careful to consider the case where PM,θ(s2, si|θ) = 0, in which case the ratio in the
numerator is not bounded by ee. However, the term drops out as Pθ(s2|si, θ) = 0 follows from the assumption
that P(si|θ) > 0. A similar argument applies for the case where PM,θ(s2, sj|θ) = 0.
Corollary 3.1. Let M be an e-differentially fair mechanism in (A,Θ), A = S1 × S2 × . . . × Sp. Then M is
2e-differentially fair in (Sk,Θ), k ∈ 1, . . . , p.
Proof. Treat A \ Sk as one “super-variable” and apply the previous argument.
Corollary 3.2. M is 2e-differentially fair in any nonempty proper subset of the protected attributes.
For example, if a loan approval mechanism M(x) is e-DF in A = Gender× Race×Nationality, it is 2e-DF
in, e.g., Gender by itself, or Gender× Nationality. In other words, by ensuring fairness at the intersection
of gender, race, and nationality under our criterion, we also ensure a similar degree of fairness between
genders overall, and between gender/nationality pairs overall, and so on. Note that in the above, 2e is a
worst case, and DF may also hold for lower values of e. We provide a more mathematically precise statement
of Corollary 3.2, and its proof, below.
Theorem 3.2. Let M be an e-differentially fair mechanism in (A,Θ), A = S1 × S2 × . . . × Sp, and let D =
Sa × . . .× Sk be the Cartesian product of a nonempty proper subset of the protected attributes included in A. Then M
is 2e-differentially fair in (D,Θ).
Proof. Define E = S1× . . .×Sa−1×Sa+1 . . .×Sk−1×Sk+1× . . .×Sp as the Cartesian product of the protected
attributes included in A but not in D. Let θ ∈ Θ. Then for any outcome y, and (si, sj) ∈ D × D where
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P(si|θ) > 0 and P(sj|θ) > 0, let q be any value of E where P(q, si|θ) > 0. (Such a q must exist, since
P(si|θ) = ∑e∈E P(E = e, si|θ) > 0.) We have:
PM,θ(M(x) = y|D = si, θ)
PM,θ(M(x) = y|D = sj, θ) =
∑e∈E PM,θ(M(x) = y|E = e, si, θ)PM,θ(E = e|si, θ)
∑e∈E PM,θ(M(x) = y|E = e, sj, θ)PM,θ(E = e|sj, θ)
=
∑e∈E
PM,θ(M(x)=y|E=e,si ,θ)
PM,θ(M(x)=y|q,si ,θ) Pθ(E = e|si, θ)
∑e∈E
PM,θ(M(x)=y|E=e,sj ,θ)
PM,θ(M(x)=y|q,si ,θ) Pθ(E = e|sj, θ)
≤ ∑e∈E e
ePθ(E = e|si, θ)
∑e∈E e−ePθ(E = e|sj, θ)
= e2e . (3)
Relationship to Simpson’s Paradox: Simpson’s reversal occurs when the sign of the association between
two variables reverses when conditioning on a third, for all (or most) of the third variable’s values [30].
This can be counter-intuitive, leading to it being termed a “paradox.” For example, a university could
admit men at a higher rate than women overall, yet admit women at a higher rate than men for each race
of applicants. Thus, the direction of discriminatory bias in admissions “paradoxically” depends on the
granularity of measurement. In the fictional scenario shown in Section 5.1 (based on real data, but for kidney
stone treatment rather than college admissions), for instance, women (Gender A) were admitted 78% of the
time, while men (Gender B) were admitted 83% of the time. Yet, women from Race 1 were admitted 93% of
the time, versus 87% for men, and women from Race 2 were admitted 73% of the time, versus 69% for men.
On the other hand, Theorem 3.1 implies, roughly speaking, that if the university is the most inequitable in
its admissions with respect to, e.g., black men, versus other groups, it cannot be inequitable to a substantially
higher degree against men overall, or against women overall. Ensuring that a satisfactory degree of
differential fairness is obtained in the intersectional case (where we aim to protect the intersection of gender
and race), thereby ensures that a similarly satisfactory degree of differential fairness is obtained in the
non-intersectional case (where we aim to protect gender alone, or race alone), even in the situation of a
Simpson’s reversal.
3.2 Bayesian Privacy Interpretation
The differential fairness definition, and the resulting level of fairness obtained at any particular measured
fairness parameter e, can be interpreted by viewing the definition through the lens of privacy. Differential
fairness ensures that given the outcome, an untrusted vendor/adversary can learn very little about the protected
attributes of the individual, relative to their prior beliefs, assuming their prior beliefs are in Θ:
e−e P(si|θ)
P(sj|θ) ≤
P(si|M(x) = y, θ)
P(sj|M(x) = y, θ) ≤ e
e P(si|θ)
P(sj|θ) . (4)
E.g., if a loan is given to an individual, the vendor or adversary’s Bayesian posterior beliefs about their
race and gender will not be substantially changed [24, 33]. Thus, an adversary will not be able to make an
inference such as “this individual was given a loan, so they are probably white and male.” Our definition can
thus provide fairness guarantees when the user of M(x) is untrusted, cf. [15]. This can prevent subsequent
discrimination, e.g. in retaliation to any fairness-preserving correction that was applied to the algorithm.
Also note that although differential fairness is a population-level definition, it provides a privacy guarantee
for individuals.
The privacy property in Equation 4 suggests a close connection to algorithmic privacy definitions, such as
differential privacy [16]. Indeed, differential privacy and our differential fairness definition are both instances
of pufferfish, a general privacy framework [24, 33]. However, differentially fair mechanisms are applied to
one individual at a time and must hide the individual’s protected attributes, while differentially private
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mechanisms are applied to the entire dataset at a time and must hide the presence of any one individual’s
data. Also note that differential privacy is typically enforced for the computation of each step of the learning
algorithm, while differential fairness pertains to the behavior of the final model.
Although we are applying a privacy-style definition to algorithmic fairness, the goals and the methods to
achieve them are quite different, as we want to de-bias the mechanism, rather than obfuscate it with noise.
To enforce differential privacy, the standard approach is to add random noise to the output of the mechanism,
frequently from the Laplace distribution [16]. While adding Laplace noise could be used to obtain differential
fairness, we do not in general recommend this approach, as it would likely obscure much of the useful
information in the data. In contrast, to enforce differential fairness, we would generally alter the mechanism,
e.g. by changing the weight parameters of a neural network appropriately. Note that unlike differential
privacy as well as individual fairness [15], we can achieve differential fairness using a mechanism M(x)
which is deterministic, since the randomness in the data is considered in the calculation of the parameter e.
Thus, there is generally no need to inject noise into the mechanism.
3.3 Interpreting e
We can understand the extent to which an e-differentially fair mechanism is fair, for a particular value of e,
by way of its corresponding privacy guarantee, which is measured on the same scale as that of differential
privacy. In particular, the level of privacy provided by e-differential privacy (and hence, differential fairness)
can be interpreted through a corresponding economic guarantee. In the case of differential privacy, if the
user contributes their data, their expected utility due to the outcome of the mechanism will be harmed by at
most a factor of exp(e) ≈ 1 + e (for small values of e) [17]. This holds regardless of their utility function.
The privacy guarantee is generally considered to be strong if e < 1 (or so), in which case the mechanism is
often described as being in the high-privacy regime. If e is substantially greater than 1, for example e = 20, the
privacy guarantee is understood to be almost meaningless.
As an example to calibrate intuitions regarding e, consider the randomized response procedure, which is
often used in the design of surveys with sensitive questions. A participant is asked to flip an unbiased coin,
and answer a yes/no question truthfully if the coin comes up heads. Otherwise, the participant flips the
coin again, and answers randomly according to the coin flip. Randomized response is e = ln(3) ≈ 1.0986-
differentially private [17], which is slightly above the “high privacy” cut-off point at around e = 1.
In our case, an e-differentially fair mechanism admits a disparity in expected utility of as much as a
factor of exp(e) between pairs of protected groups with si ∈ A, sj ∈ A, for any utility function that could be
chosen. For example, consider a loan approval process, where the utility of being given a loan is 1, and being
denied is 0. Suppose the approval process is ln(3)-differentially fair, i.e. the same value of e as randomized
response in terms of the strength of the corresponding privacy guarantee. The approval process could
then be three times as likely to award a loan to white men as to white women, and thus award white men
three times the expected utility as white women. The proof follows the case of differential privacy [17]. Let
u(y) : Range(M(x))→ R≥0 be a utility function. Then we have:
EPM,θ
[
u(y)|si
]
=
∫
PM,θ(y|si)u(y)dy
≤
∫
eePM,θ(y|sj)u(y)dy
= eeEPM,θ
[
u(y)|sj
]
. (5)
4 Measuring Bias in Data
We can extend differential fairness to measure the intrinsic bias in a dataset (as opposed to an algorithm).
This allows us to quantify bias in non-algorithmic (or black box) processes, e.g. stop-and-frisk policing
interactions [32]. Intersectionality theory asserts that the labels in our data, which correspond to outcomes
assigned to individuals, may be systematically biased, due to societal structures of oppression, including
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racism, sexism, and the prison-industrial complex [14]. Our goal is to measure this bias. Suppose we observe
a dataset of N individuals with features x, including protected attributes A, who are assigned outcomes
y. We deconstruct the distribution of the data as P(x, y) = P(x)P(y|x), and use these factors to specify the
elements of the differential fairness definition, as M(x) = y ∼ P(y|x), and Θ = {P(x)}. We again consider
model-based and empirical definitions.
Definition 4.1. A labeled dataset {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN)} is e-differentially fair (DF) in A with respect to model
PModel(x, y) if mechanism M(x) = y ∼ PModel(y|x) is e-differentially fair in framework (A, {PModel(x)}), for
PModel trained on the dataset.
Definition 4.2. A labeled dataset {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN)} with corresponding empirical distribution PData(x, y)
is e-empirically differentially fair (EDF) in A if mechanism M(x) = y ∼ PData(y|x) is e-differentially fair in
framework (A, {PData(x)}).
Assuming discrete outcomes, PData(y|s) = Ny,sNs , where Ny,s and Ns are empirical counts of their sub-
scripted values in the dataset. Definition 4.2 corresponds to verifying that for any y, si, sj, we have
e−e ≤ Ny,si
Nsi
Nsj
Ny,sj
≤ ee , (6)
whenever Nsi > 0 and Nsi > 0. In practice, we may wish to apply a Dirichlet prior for smoothing.
Using Definition 4.1 with the model PModel(y|s) chosen to be the posterior predictive distribution of a
Dirichlet-multinomial model for outcomes given protected attributes s, the criterion for any y, si, sj becomes
e−e ≤ Ny,si + α
Nsi + |Y|α
Nsj + |Y|α
Ny,sj + α
≤ ee , (7)
where scalar α is each entry of the parameter of a symmetric Dirichlet prior with concentration parameter
|Y|α, Y = Range(M). More complex models are expected to be useful when the protected attributes are
high dimensional, which leads to data sparsity in Ny,s.
4.1 Measuring Bias Amplification
Similarly to differential privacy, non-negative differences e2 − e1 between two mechanisms M1(x) and
M2(x) are meaningful (for fixed A and Θ, and for tightly computed minimum values of e), and measure the
additional “privacy cost” of using one mechanism instead of the other, when interpreting differential fairness
as a privacy definition. From an economic perspective, M2(x) admits at most an exp(e2 − e1) ≈ 1 + e2 − e1
(for small values of e2 − e1) multiplicative increase in the disparity of expected utility between pairs of
protected intersections of groups with si ∈ A, sj ∈ A, relative to M1(x). When e1 is the (empirical) differential
fairness of a labeled dataset and e2 is the (empirical) differential fairness of a classifier trained on the dataset,
e2 − e1 is a measure of the extent to which the classifier increases the unfairness over the original data, a
phenomenon that [38] refer to as bias amplification.
5 Illustrative Worked Examples
A simple worked example of differential fairness is given in Figure 2. In the example, given an applicant’s
score x on a standardized test, the mechanism M(x) = x ≥ t approves the hiring of a job applicant if their
test score x ≥ t, with t = 10.5. The scores are distributed according to θ, which corresponds to the following
process. The applicants protected group is 1 or 2 with probability 0.5. Test scores for group 1 are normally
distributed N(x; µ1 = 10, σ = 1), and for group 2 are distributed N(x; µ2 = 12, σ = 1). In the figure, the
group-conditional densities are plotted on the top, along with the threshold for the hiring outcome being
yes (i.e. M(x) = 1). Shaded areas indicate the probability of a yes hiring decision for each group (overlap in
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Figure 2: Worked example of differential fairness from Section 5. The calculations above show that e = 2.337.
purple). On the bottom, the calculations show that M(x) is e-differentially fair for e = 2.337. This means that
the probability ratios are bounded within the range (e−e, ee) = (0.0966, 10.35), i.e. one group has around 10
times the probability of some particular hiring outcome than the other (y = no). Under the presumption that
the two groups are roughly equally capable of performing the job overall, this is clearly unsatisfactory in
terms of fairness.
5.1 Intersectional Example: Simpson’s Paradox
The intersectional setting, in which there are multiple protected variables, is specifically addressed by
differential fairness, by considering the probabilities of outcomes for each intersection of the set of protected
variables. We illustrate this setting with an example that is commonly used to demonstrate Simpson’s
paradox [9, 22]. Our example is adapted from a real-world scenario which considers the success probabilities
of two treatments for kidney stones (treatments A and B), depending on whether the kidney stones are large
or small. Counter-intuitively, treatment A is more effective for small stones, and also for large stones, yet
treatment B is more effective overall when the results for both stone sizes are aggregated. This apparently
paradoxical result is explained by an unobserved confounding factor, the severity of the case, which affects
the doctors’ decision on which treatment to use, with the more powerful and effective treatment, treatment
B, typically being favored in more severe cases only [22].
We adapt the data from the kidney stone example to an analogous fairness scenario in which treatment
success is replaced by a favored outcome, admission of a prospective student to University X, and treatment
and stone size are replaced by protected attributes, gender and race, respectively (Table 1). The mechanism
in this case is the admissions process, a black box which we model empirically based on count data via
Definition 4.2 and Equation 6. In our adapted scenario, Simpson’s “paradox” occurs because the direction of
“unfairness” with regard to Gender depends on whether Race is also measured: individuals of Gender A are
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Probability of Being Admitted to University X
Gender
A B Overall
Race 1
81
87
234
270
315
357
2 192263
55
80
247
343
Overall 273350
289
350
Table 1: Intersectional example: Simpson’s paradox.
Protected attributes e-EDF
nationality 0.219
race 0.930
gender 1.03
gender, nationality 1.16
race, nationality 1.21
race, gender 1.76
race, gender, nationality 2.14
Table 2: Empirical differential fairness of the Adult dataset.
more likely to be admitted than those of Gender B for both races, but Gender B is more likely to be admitted
overall.
By calculating the log probability ratios of (Gender, Race) pairs from Table 1, as well as for the pairs of
probabilities for the declined admission outcome (1− P(admit)), and plugging them into Equation 6, we
can readily find that the mechanism is e = 1.511-EDF with A = Gender× Race. Theorem 3.1 shows that the
mechanism is at most 2e = 3.022-EDF for A = Gender and for A = Race. Thus, even with the occurrence of
a Simpson’s reversal the level of differential (un)fairness may not substantially increase after aggregating.
Indeed, by calculating e using the admission probabilities in the Overall row (Gender) and the Overall column
(Race), we find that e = 0.2329 for A = Gender, and e = 0.8667 for A = Race.
As we have seen, differential fairness can be used to measure the inequity between the outcome probabil-
ities for the protected groups and their intersections at different levels of measurement granularity, although
it does not determine whether the inequities were due to systemic factors and/or discrimination. In this
case, analogously to the kidney stone setting, one confounding variable which could explain this Simpson’s
reversal is the decision of the prospective student on whether to apply to University X, which likely depends
on their interests and their self-assessment of the likelihood of admission. In practice, this may need to be
determined via background knowledge or further analysis.
6 Case Study of Differential Fairness
To illustrate the practical application of differential fairness, we performed a case study on 1994 U.S. census
income data, using the Adult dataset from the UCI repository [25]. The dataset consists of 14 attributes
regarding work, relationships, and demographics for individuals, who are labeled according to whether
their income exceeds a threshold of $50, 000. The data is pre-split into a training set of 32,561 instances and a
test set of 16,281 instances. For our fairness analysis, we select race, gender, and nationality as the protected
attributes. As most instances have U.S. nationality, we treat nationality as binary between U.S. and “other.”
Gender is coded as binary. The race attribute has 5 values, however we merged the Native American category
with the “other” category for the fairness analysis, as both contained very few instances. In Table 2, we
report e for empirical differential fairness, via Equation 6, for each subset of the protected attributes, on the
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Sensitive attributes used e-DF algorithm-DF Error rate
as features for the classifier –test data-DF
none 2.14 0.074 14.90
nationality 1.95 -0.12 14.92
race 2.65 0.59 15.18
gender 2.14 0.074 14.99
gender, nationality 2.59 0.53 15.09
race, nationality 2.58 0.52 15.17
race, gender 2.71 0.64 15.01
race, gender, nationality 2.65 0.59 15.21
Table 3: Differential fairness of logistic regression (Adult dataset, protected attributes were gender, race,
nationality). Dirichlet smoothing was used, as in Equation 7, with α = 1. The test dataset was e = 2.06-DF.
training set. Our analysis finds that the inequity, as measured by e-EDF, is less for nationality than for race
or gender. The inequity at the intersection of race and gender is substantially higher than that of either attribute
alone (e = 1.76, versus 0.93 and 1.03), while this gap is smaller for the other two-attribute intersections.
We also calculated differential fairness for a logistic regression model, using all 3 protected attributes to
calculate e on the test set (Table 3). We evaluated the impact of a manual feature selection pre-processing step
of withholding these attributes from the classifier, on both accuracy and fairness. Interestingly, the test error
was lowest when the classifier used none of the sensitive attributes, while also obtaining the near-lowest e.
In particular, allowing the classifier to use race as a feature increased both the error rates and the unfairness e. One
explanation is that including race introduces feature redundancies, and the consequent overfitting causes
both the accuracy and fairness issues. While we were here able to simultaneously improve fairness and
accuracy, this may not always be the case [4]. In that scenario, a compromise must be determined by the
analyst, weighing e against accuracy.
We further report the difference in e values between the fairness of the algorithm and the fairness in the
data, empirically calculated on the test set (e = 2.06-DF), in the third column of Table 3. This is a measure of
the extent to which the learning algorithm magnifies the bias present in the original data, a phenomenon
known as bias amplification [38]. In most cases, the bias of the data was increased by the learning algorithm.
Interestingly, when the classifier was given the nationality attribute, the bias was slightly less than that of the
original training data. We hypothesize that this is once again due to overfitting, but in this case the classifier
learned a kind of “reverse discrimination,” in the opposite direction to the other biases.
7 Related Work
This section discusses relationships with other concepts in fairness, privacy, and in the treatment of subsets
of protected groups.
7.1 Fairness Definitions
An overview of fairness research can be found in [4]. We briefly describe several of the most influential math-
ematical definitions of fairness below, and discuss their relationships to our proposed criterion, differential
fairness.
Demographic Parity: Dwork et al. [15] defined (and criticized) the fairness notion of demographic parity,
a.k.a. statistical parity, which requires that P(y|si) = P(y|sj) for any outcome y and pairs of protected
attribute values si, sj (here assumed to be a single attribute). This can be relaxed, e.g. by requiring the total
variation distance between the distributions to be less than e. Differential fairness is closely related as it
also aims to match probabilities of outcomes, but measures differences using ratios, and allows for multiple
protected attributes. The criticisms of [15] are mainly related to ways in which subgroups of the protected
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groups can be treated differently while maintaining demographic parity, which they call “subset targeting,”
and which [23] term “fairness gerrymandering.” Differential fairness explicitly protects the intersection of
multiple protected attributes, which can be used to mitigate some of these abuses.
Equalized Odds: To address some of the limitations with demographic parity, Hardt et al. [18] propose
to instead ensure that a classifier has equal error rates for each protected group. This fairness definition,
called equalized odds, can loosely be understood as a notion of “demographic parity for error rates instead
of outcomes.” Unlike demographic parity, equalized odds rewards accurate classification, and penalizes
systems only performing well on the majority group. However, theoretical work has shown that equalized
odds is typically incompatible with correctly calibrated probability estimates [31]. It is also a relatively weak
notion of fairness from a civil rights perspective compared to demographic parity, as it does not ensure
that outcomes are distributed equitably. Hardt et al. also propose a variant definition called equality of
opportunity, which relaxes equalized odds to only apply to a deserving outcome. It is straightforward to
extend differential fairness to a definition analogous to equalized odds while porting an analogous privacy
guarantee of Equation 4, although we leave the exploration of this for future work.
Subgroup Fairness and Multicalibration: Kearns et al. [23] provide fairness definitions which address
the targeting of certain classes of subgroups of a protected group (subset targeting, or fairness gerrymandering).
Their statistical parity subgroup fairness and false positive subgroup fairness definitions are analogous to statistical
parity and equalized odds, respectively, but they ensure that each of a specified collection of subgroups
simultaneously satisfies the analogous definition, unless that subgroup is a very small fraction of the
population. Contemporaneously publishing with [23] at ICML 2018, He´bert-Johnson et al. [19] introduced
multicalibration, a similar fairness definition to subgroup fairness, but for calibration.
Individual Fairness (“Fairness Through Awareness”): The individual fairness definition, due to Dwork
et al. [15], mathematically enforces the principle that similar individuals should get similar outcomes under a
classification algorithm. An advantage of this approach is that it preserves the privacy of the individuals,
which can be important when the user of the classifications (the vendor), e.g. a banking corporation, cannot be
trusted to act in a fair manner. However, this is difficult to implement in practice as one must define ”similar”
in a fair way. The individual fairness property also does not necessarily generalize beyond training set. In this
work, we take inspiration from Dwork et al.’s untrusted vendor scenario, and the use of a privacy-preserving
fairness definition to address it.
Counterfactual Fairness: Kusner et al. [26] propose a causal definition of fairness. Under their coun-
terfactual fairness definition, changing protected attributes A, while holding things which are not causally
dependent on A constant, will not change the predicted distribution of outcomes. While theoretically
appealing, there are difficulties in implementing this in practice. First, it requires an accurate causal model at
the fine-grained individual level, while even obtaining a correct population-level causal model is generally
very difficult. To implement it, we must solve a challenging causal inference problem over unobserved
variables, which generally requires approximate inference algorithms such as Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods [12]. Finally, to achieve counterfactual fairness, the predictions (usually) cannot make
direct use of any descendant of A in the causal model. This generally precludes using any of the observed
features as inputs to the classifier.
Threshold Tests: [32] address infra-marginality by modeling risk probabilities for different subsets (i.e.
attribute values) within each protected category, and requiring algorithms to threshold these probabilities at
the same points when determining outcomes. In contrast, based on intersectionality theory, our proposed
differential fairness criterion specifies protected categories whose intersecting subsets should be treated
equally, regardless of differences in risk across the subsets. Our definition is appropriate when the differences
in risk are due to structural systems of oppression, i.e. the risk probabilities themselves are impacted by an
unfair process.
7.2 Privacy Definitions
Differential Privacy: Our work on fairness is inspired by differential privacy, the gold-standard notion of
privacy for data-driven algorithms [16, 17]. Essentially, differential privacy is a promise: if an individual
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contributes their data to a dataset, their resulting utility, due to algorithms applied to that dataset, will not
be substantially affected. The privacy guarantee is obtained via the use of randomized algorithms, typically
by adding sufficient noise, e.g. from the Laplace distribution, in order to obfuscate the impact of any one
data point on the algorithms’ outputs.
Definition 7.1. M(x) is e-differentially private if
P(M(x) ∈ S)
P(M(x′) ∈ S) ≤ e
e
for all outcomes S , and pairs of databases x, x′ differing in a single element.
Similarly to differential privacy, our proposed differential fairness definition bounds ratios of probabilities
of outcomes resulting from a mechanism. However, there are several important differences. When bounding
these ratios, differential fairness considers different values of a set of protected attributes, rather than
databases that differ in a single element. It posits a specified set of possible distributions which may generate
the data, while differential privacy implicitly assumes that the data are independent [24]. Finally, since
differential fairness considers randomness in data as well as in the mechanism, it can be satisfied with a
deterministic mechanism, while differential privacy can only be satisfied with a randomized mechanism.
Pufferfish: Kifer and Machanavajjhala [24] generalized differential privacy by using a variation of
Equation 1 to hide the values of an arbitrary set of secrets.
Definition 7.2. A mechanism M(x) is e-pufferfish private in a framework (S, Q,Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with x ∼ θ,
for all secret pairs (si, sj) ∈ Q and y ∈ Range(M),
e−e ≤ PM,θ(M(x) = y|si, θ)
PM,θ(M(x) = y|sj, θ) ≤ e
e , (8)
when si and sj are such that P(si|θ) > 0, P(sj|θ) > 0.
The differential privacy criterion corresponds to a special case of pufferfish where the secrets are each
individual’s data, the individuals’ data points are assumed to be independent, and any datasets differing
by one individual must be indistinguishable. Differential fairness adapts pufferfish to the task of defining
algorithmic fairness, by selecting a set of protected attributes as the secrets, and ensuring that the values of
these attributes are indistinguishable. Thus, differential fairness provides a closely related privacy guarantee
to differential privacy.
7.3 Other Related Work
Fairness and Intersectionality: Of particular relevance to this work, fairness in an intersectional setting
has been considered by [7] in a computer vision context, and by [23] and [19], who aim to protect certain
subgroups by preventing “fairness gerrymandering.”
Fairness and Uncertainty: Bayesian modeling of fairness has been performed by [32] in the context of
stop-and-frisk policing, and by [26], who use Bayesian inference on a causal model. As an alternative to the
Bayesian methodology, adversarial methods are another strategy for managing uncertainty in a fairness
context, e.g. [5] apply this approach to the setting of ensuring fairness given a limited number of observations
in which demographic information is available.
8 Conclusion
We proposed differential fairness, a mathematical measure of fairness based on intersectionality, and which is
related to differential privacy. Our empirical results show how differential fairness can measure (un)fairness
with multiple protected attributes in order to identify inequities in algorithms and data, and the effects of
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engineering choices such as feature selection. In future, we plan to develop learning algorithms which use
our criterion as a regularizer to automatically balance the trade-off between fairness and accuracy, following
[3], and Bayesian models which estimate data distributions for differential fairness in a data-efficient manner.
References
[1] J. Angwin, J. Larson, S. Mattu, and L. Kirchner. Machine bias: Theres software used across the country
to predict future criminals. and its biased against blacks. ProPublica, May, 23, 2016.
[2] S. Barocas and A. D. Selbst. Big data’s disparate impact. Cal. L. Rev., 104:671, 2016.
[3] R. Berk, H. Heidari, S. Jabbari, M. Joseph, M. Kearns, J. Morgenstern, S. Neel, and A. Roth. A convex
framework for fair regression. 4th Annual Workshop on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in
Machine Learning. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1706.02409 [cs.LG], 2017.
[4] R. Berk, H. Heidari, S. Jabbari, M. Kearns, and A. Roth. Fairness in criminal justice risk assessments: The
state of the art. In Sociological Methods and Research (conditionally accepted), arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.09207
[stat.ML], 1050:28, 2018.
[5] A. Beutel, J. Chen, Z. Zhao, and E. H. Chi. Data decisions and theoretical implications when adversarially
learning fair representations. In Proceedings of 2017 Workshop on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
in Machine Learning, Halifax, Canada, 2017.
[6] T. Bolukbasi, K.-W. Chang, J. Y. Zou, V. Saligrama, and A. T. Kalai. Man is to computer programmer as
woman is to homemaker? Debiasing word embeddings. In Advances in NIPS, 2016.
[7] J. Buolamwini and T. Gebru. Gender shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender
classification. In Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, pages 77–91, 2018.
[8] A. Campolo, M. Sanfilippo, M. Whittaker, A. S. Kate Crawford, and S. Barocas. AI Now 2017 Symposium
Report. AI Now, 2017.
[9] C. R. Charig, D. R. Webb, S. R. Payne, and J. E. Wickham. Comparison of treatment of renal calculi by
open surgery, percutaneous nephrolithotomy, and extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy. British Medical
Journal (BMJ) (Clin Res Ed), 292(6524):879–882, 1986.
[10] P. H. Collins. Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment (2nd ed.).
Routledge, 2002 [1990].
[11] Combahee River Collective. A black feminist statement. In Z. Eisenstein, editor, Capitalist Patriarchy and
the Case for Socialist Feminism. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978.
[12] M. Cowles and B. Carlin. Markov chain Monte Carlo convergence diagnostics: A comparative review.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 91(434):883–904, 1996.
[13] K. Crenshaw. Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrim-
ination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. U. Chi. Legal F., pages 139–167, 1989.
[14] A. Y. Davis. Are prisons obsolete? Seven Stories Press, 2011.
[15] C. Dwork, M. Hardt, T. Pitassi, O. Reingold, and R. Zemel. Fairness through awareness. In Proceedings
of the 3rd innovations in theoretical computer science conference, pages 214–226. ACM, 2012.
[16] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis.
In Theory of Cryptography, pages 265–284. Springer, 2006.
14
[17] C. Dwork and A. Roth. The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy. Theoretical Computer Science,
9(3-4):211–407, 2013.
[18] M. Hardt, E. Price, N. Srebro, et al. Equality of opportunity in supervised learning. In Advances in NIPS,
pages 3315–3323, 2016.
[19] U. Hebert-Johnson, M. Kim, O. Reingold, and G. Rothblum. Multicalibration: Calibration for the
(Computationally-identifiable) masses. In J. Dy and A. Krause, editors, Proceedings of the 35th International
Conference on Machine Learning, volume 80 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 1944–1953,
Stockholmsmssan, Stockholm Sweden, 10–15 Jul 2018. PMLR.
[20] b. hooks. Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. South End Press, 1981.
[21] D. B. Hunt. Redlining. Encyclopedia of Chicago, 2005.
[22] S. A. Julious and M. A. Mullee. Confounding and simpson’s paradox. British Medical Journal (BMJ),
309(6967):1480–1481, 1994.
[23] M. Kearns, S. Neel, A. Roth, and Z. S. Wu. Preventing fairness gerrymandering: Auditing and learning
for subgroup fairness. In J. Dy and A. Krause, editors, Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on
Machine Learning, PMLR 80, volume 80 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 2569–2577,
Stockholmsmssan, Stockholm Sweden, 10–15 Jul 2018. PMLR.
[24] D. Kifer and A. Machanavajjhala. Pufferfish: A framework for mathematical privacy definitions. ACM
Transactions on Database Systems (TODS), 39(1):3, 2014.
[25] R. Kohavi. Scaling up the accuracy of naive-Bayes classifiers: a decision-tree hybrid. In Proceedings of
the Second International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 202–207, 1996.
[26] M. J. Kusner, J. Loftus, C. Russell, and R. Silva. Counterfactual fairness. In Advances in NIPS, 2017.
[27] A. Lorde. Age, race, class, and sex: Women redefining difference. In Sister Outsider, pages 114–124. Ten
Speed Press, 1984.
[28] C. Munoz, M. Smith, and D. Patil. Big data: A report on algorithmic systems, opportunity, and civil rights.
Executive Office of the President, 2016.
[29] S. U. Noble. Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. NYU Press, 2018.
[30] J. Pearl. Comment: understanding Simpsons paradox. The American Statistician, 68(1):8–13, 2014.
[31] G. Pleiss, M. Raghavan, F. Wu, J. Kleinberg, and K. Q. Weinberger. On fairness and calibration. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 5684–5693, 2017.
[32] C. Simoiu, S. Corbett-Davies, S. Goel, et al. The problem of infra-marginality in outcome tests for
discrimination. The Annals of Applied Statistics, 11(3):1193–1216, 2017.
[33] S. Song, Y. Wang, and K. Chaudhuri. Pufferfish privacy mechanisms for correlated data. In Proceedings
of the 2017 ACM International Conference on Management of Data, pages 1291–1306. ACM, 2017.
[34] C. Starmans, M. Sheskin, and P. Bloom. Why people prefer unequal societies. Nature Human Behaviour,
1(4):0082, 2017.
[35] S. Truth. Ain’t I a woman?, 1851. Speech delivered at Women’s Rights Convention, Akron, Ohio.
[36] C. Verschelden. Bandwidth Recovery: Helping Students Reclaim Cognitive Resources Lost to Poverty, Racism,
and Social Marginalization. Stylus Publishing, LLC, 2017.
15
[37] J. Wald and D. J. Losen. Defining and redirecting a school-to-prison pipeline. New directions for youth
development, 2003(99):9–15, 2003.
[38] J. Zhao, T. Wang, M. Yatskar, V. Ordonez, and K.-W. Chang. Men also like shopping: Reducing gender
bias amplification using corpus-level constraints. In Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing,
2017.
16
